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Adam Smith lectured in jurisprudence during his time as Professor of 
Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow (1752-1764).  Jurisprudence 
covered private law and most of public law, and Smith cites generous amounts 
of Roman law, English law, and Scots law.  The lectures are known to us 
mainly through two sets of students’ notes, based on lectures given in 1762-63 
and (probably) 1763-64 respectively1.  These lectures were part of a larger 
 
* The author is grateful to have had the advice of Peter Stein and John Cairns in 
preparing this essay. 
1 The two lectures are published together in the critical edition: Adam Smith, Lectures 
on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein, Oxford 1978, reprinted 
Indianapolis 1982.  The editors have assigned the title 'Report of 1762-63' to the earlier, and 
'Report dated 1766' to the later, of the notes; references to these reports are abbreviated below 
to LJ(A) and LJ(B), respectively.  Interest in these lectures is high, because the notes to LJ(A) 
were discovered comparatively recently, in 1958.  The notes to LJ(B) were discovered in 
1895, and published in Adam Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, delivered 
in the University of Glasgow, ed. E. Cannan, Oxford 1896.  In addition to these two sets of 
notes, we possess some extracts from a student's notes to an earlier course of Smith's lectures, 
perhaps given in the middle 1750s: R. L. Meek, New Light on Adam Smith's Glasgow Lectures 
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course of lectures on moral philosophy2, and presented the history of laws and 
institutions in the framework of a certain historical jurisprudence.  This 
historical jurisprudence was not peculiar to Smith; it had been used by some of 
his contemporaries and predecessors.  Montesquieu was probably the first to 
use it3, and other writers, French and Scottish, quickly took it up4.  Smith was 
one of its principal contributors5, refining the ideas and combining them with 
the ethics he had developed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments6. 
 
on Jurisprudence, History of Political Economy, 8 (1976), p. 466-77  [ = R. L. Meek, Smith, 
Marx and After, London 1977, p. 81-91] ('Anderson Notes').  There are also some brief 
remarks on the lectures related by Dugald Stewart, professor of moral philosophy at 
Edinburgh, from an account given to him by one of Smith's pupils: Dugald Stewart, Account 
of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, LL.D. [1793], in: Adam Smith: Essays on 
Philosphical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman, J. C. Bryce, and I. S. Ross, Oxford 1980, 
reprinted Indianapolis 1982, p. 273-76. 
2 On the content, see Stewart, Account (supra, n. 1), p. 274-75 (account of John 
Millar).  The moral philosophy lectures covered natural theology, ethics, and jurisprudence, 
the last of these subdivided into justice and 'political regulations founded on the principle of 
expediency' (= police, revenue, and arms).  The distinction between 'justice' and 'police, 
revenue, and arms' in Smith's thought is based on ideas developed in TMS, ideas which Smith 
presented in the lectures on ethics.  Ibid., 274.  
3 Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois XVIII ('Des lois, dans le rapport qu'elles ont avec la 
nature du terrain').  MacCormick has found suggestions of this jurisprudence earlier, in Stair 
(see Viscount of Stair [James Dalrymple], The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, ed. D. M. 
Walker, Edinburgh 1981, p. 306-307 (at 2.1.29-32)).  N. MacCormick, Law and 
Enlightenment, in:  The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. R. H. Campbell 
and A. S. Skinner, Edinburgh 1982, p. 160-63.  His larger point is that a belief in a rational 
natural law is not incompatible with a belief in social change.  Ibid., 160.  
4 The subject has been treated extensively in R. L. Meek, Social Science and the 
Ignoble Savage, Cambridge 1976.  Among the French writers after Montesquieu, Turgot is the 
most prominent: see Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, A Philosophical Review of the Successive 
Advances of the Human Mind, in: R. L. Meek, ed., Turgot on Progress, Sociology and 
Economics, Cambridge 1973, p. 41-59; idem, Plan d'un ouvrage sur la géographie politique, 
in: Oeuvres de Turgot, 1, ed. G. Schelle, Paris 1913, p. 259-60.  Among the Scottish writers, 
besides Smith, the most prominent contributors are Kames, Sir John Dalrymple of Cranstoun, 
and John Millar.  See Lord Kames [Henry Home], Historical Law-Tracts, 2nd ed., Edinburgh 
1761, p. 81-100; John Dalrymple, An Essay Towards a General History of Feudal Property in 
Great Britain, 2nd ed., London 1758, p. 75-78 (under the title 'History of the Alienation of 
Land-property'); John Millar, An Historical View of the English Government, London 1787, p. 
27-41 (under the title 'Character and Manner of the Saxon'). 
5 Meek says that a good case may be made that Smith was the originator of the theory 
in its most famous form: the 'four stages theory'.  Meek, Social Science (supra, n. 4), p. 99.  
More guarded: A. S. Skinner, Historical Theory, in: A System of Social Science: Papers 
Relating to Adam Smith, 2nd ed., Oxford 1996, p. 98-99. 
6 For discussions of this combination of historical jurisprudence and morals, see P. 
Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea, Cambridge 1980, p. 39-46;  K. Haakonssen, The 
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 This essay discusses Smith's treatment of Roman servitudes and the 
difficulties he met in bringing servitudes into his historical jurisprudence.  
These difficulties are not specific to servitudes, but part of a wider problem 
affecting Smith's project.  The problem very briefly is this.  Smith was a 
highly learned man and entirely at home in the sources of antiquity7.  But he 
had set himself the difficult task of explaining the 'causes' of laws and 
institutions, and Roman law gave him a surfeit of information.  This 
information had to be accommodated to the theory, even when it was awkward 
to do so.  Writers in the earlier tradition had attributed certain rules to the 
existence of civil authority, reserving others to the state of nature.  Smith 
aspired to something more difficult and could not be so general in his 
conclusions: a civilization existed in one or another distinct 'age', and the 
historical data had to be explained causally with respect to each age. 
The success of Smith's historical jurisprudence has always been uncertain.  
He hoped in his lifetime to complete a book on the general principles of law 
and government, and he probably intended to treat his jurisprudence more 
thoroughly there8.  He was not able to complete the book, and he directed the 
drafts to be burned before his death.  The reasons for his failure to complete 
the book are not known, and some have speculated that he met a serious 
obstacle he could not overcome9.  I suggest below that servitudes caused him 
to stumble, but not that the wider problem which servitudes represented was a 
serious obstacle.  To the contrary, I suggest that Smith may have recognized 
the problem and undertaken to solve it by being more selective in his use of 
Roman law sources. 
 
Science of the Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith, 
Cambridge 1981, chh. 5-8.  References below to The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) are 
to the critical edition: Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. 
L. Macfie, Oxford 1976, reprinted Indianapolis 1982.  
7 See Stewart, Account (supra, n. 1), p. 272;  P. G. Stein, Adam Smith's Theory of Law 
and Society, in: Classical Influences on Western Thought, A.D. 1650-1870, ed. R. R. Bolgar, 
Cambridge 1979, p. 265-73; G. Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical 
Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought, Oxford 2001, p. 1-6. 
8 His Wealth of Nations fulfilled his goal so far as political regulations were concerned, 
but not so far as justice was concerned.  References below to Wealth of Nations (WN) are to 
the critical edition: Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd, Oxford 1976, reprinted 
Indianapolis 1981, 2 vols. 
9 See C. Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, Cambridge 1999, p. 
30-31, 256-58, and the discussion and literature cited in D. Winch, Adam Smith's Politics: an 
Essay in Historiographic Revision, Cambridge 1978, p. 12-27. 
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1.  —  Smith's two accounts of Roman servitudes 
The excerpts from Smith's lectures given below are very slightly 
abbreviated.  I have omitted some of the conventional portions of his account10 
in order to focus on what is unique11. 
a)  Lectures of 1762-63 
Smith discusses servitudes under the heading of real rights.  In this passage 
he gives the fullest description of his views12. 
Servitudes are burthens or claims that one man has on the property of another.  The 
Romans considered servitudes as being either real or personal; i.e. as being due by a 
certain person or by a certain thing. . . .  It is to be observed that all servitudes were 
originally personall; and this will easily appear if we consider the manner in which they 
have been introduced.  Thus to take a common instance, we shall suppose that the farm of 
one man lies betwixt the high way or the market town and the farm of his neighbour.  
Here it will be very convenient if not highly necessary that the possessor of the former 
farm should have the liberty of a road thro the farm of his neighbour.  This he may obtain 
for a certain gratuity from the possessor; and take his obligation to grant him that liberty 
in time to come.  This would be given him not as being such a man but as being possessor 
of such a farm, and would be stipulated not only for him but for his heirs and successors 
likewise.  And if he should afterwards sell or dispose of his farm he would account that 
liberty as a part of his possessions, and demand some reasonable compensation for it from 
the purchaser as well as for the farm itself.—But let us suppose that the proprietor of the 
servient farm should dispose of his farm, and that he should according to agreement with 
the owner of the dom. praed. take the purchaser bound to grant him the liberty stipulated; 
that the farm in this manner passes thro three or four different hands; and that the 4th 
possessor refuses to grant him the liberty stipulated.  In what manner shall he compel him 
to perform it.  He is bound indeed to the third possessor, but not to him, so that the dom. 
prae. dom. can have no action against him.  He can only come at his right by raising an 
action against the first possessor, to make him perform the obligation he had come under.  
He again might compel the 2d, and he the third, and he the 4th; or he might raise an action 
against the 1st to oblige him to cede to him the obligation the 2d had come under, and 
then the 2d the 3rd and so on.  To prevent such a multiplicity of actions, which would 
often be very troublesome, it came to be enacted by actio servitia [sc. actio Serviana], and 
afterwards by the actio quasi servit. [sc. actio quasi-Serviana], first that some and 
afterwards that the greater part of servitudes should be considered as real rights. 
. . .  
 
10 LJ(A) i.17-18 gives a more conventional treatment: it is set out below in the text 
accompanying note 114, where I discuss its significance. 
11 I have reproduced the spelling and punctuation of the critical edition without noting 
where they would depart from modern conventions. 
12 LJ(A) ii.14-16, 19. 
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All burthens on property, as they can only have taken their rise from a contract, must 
originally have been personall, as was said, for a contract can produce nothing but a 
personall right.  They became real only by the intervention of the law. 
He goes on to discuss other real rights, and concludes:13 
I have now considered the severall real rights, not only property but also servitudes and 
pledges, and shown that these were originally merely personall rights, tho by the 
determination of the legislature, to prevent the confusion this was found to produce, they 
were afterwards changed into real rights. 
b)  Lectures of 1763-64 
In this set of lectures, some of the relevant discussion falls at the very 
beginning, by way of introduction to the lectures as a whole.14 
Servitudes are burthens upon the property of another.  Thus I may have a liberty of 
passing thro' a field belonging to another which lyes between me and the high way, or if 
my neighbour have plenty of water in his fields and I have none in mine for my cattle, I 
may have a right to drive them to his.  Such burthens on the property of another are called 
servitudes.  These rights were originally personal, but the trouble and expence of 
numerous lawsuits in order to get possession of them, when the adjacent property which 
was burthened with them passed thro' a number of hands, induced legislators to make 
them real, and claimable a quocumque possessore.  Afterwards the property was 
transferred with these servitudes upon it.  
Further on is a fuller discussion, corresponding to the first of the quoted 
passages from the earlier lectures:15 
The second species of real rights is servitudes, or burthens which one man has on the 
property of another.  These rights were at first personal, as they were entered into by a 
contract between the persons.  It is necessary that I should have a road to the market town.  
If a man's estate lye between me and it, I must bargain with him for the priviledge of a 
road thro' it.  This contract produces only a personal right, tho' I should bind him not to 
sell this estate without the burthen.  But here was an inconveniencey, for if the land were 
sold and the new proprietor refused the road, I could not sue him on a personal right upon 
the former proprietor.  Before I can come at the new purchaser I must pursue the person 
from whom I had the right, who must pursue him to whom he sold it.  If the land has gone 
thro' several hands this is very tedious and inconvenient.  The law, to remedy this, made 
servitudes real rights, demandable a quocumque possessore. . . .  [Servitudes] are all 
naturaly personal rights and are only made real by lawyers. 
 
13 LJ(A) ii.37. 
14 LJ(B) 9. 
15 LJ(B) 172. 
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2.  —  A modern critique 
What is unusual here is the proposition that servitudes originally gave rise 
to personal rights.  It will be useful to set down how a modern reader would 
probably respond to this proposition before discussing the significance of 
these passages. 
 (1)  It is hazardous to speculate about the real or personal character of 
rights in early Rome16.  In the classical law, where litigation was carried out 
with clear, written pleadings and where a substantial juristic literature helps us 
to distinguish one claim from another, distinctions such as 'real' and 'personal' 
are relatively easy to identify17.  But in the pre-classical law, where 
information is limited and strict legal forms dominated in both transactions 
and litigation, the modern reader tends to rely heavily on the forms, and does 
not leap to characterize an institution as real or personal without evidence.  To 
understand what character a servitude assumed in the earliest law, a modern 
reader would consider, e.g., how servitudes were created, extinguished, or 
enforced18. 
 (2)  The view that Roman predial servitudes (the focus of Smith's 
discussion) were originally personal in nature, but were then made real by law, 
is an eccentric view19.  The modern view is the very opposite, that predial 
servitudes, if anything, were historically even more profoundly tied to the 
property that was their object.  The four original servitudes (iter, actus, via, 
aquae ductus) were res mancipi and transferred by mancipatio: this suggests 
that ownership of a servitude was originally regarded as the ownership of a 
corporeal thing (a patch of earth, a spring), the ownership being shared in 
 
16 I pass over the question whether it is correct to speak of 'rights' at all in early (or 
classical) Rome.  See H. F. Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law, Oxford 1957, p. 
73.  It almost certainly is not, but the point is not relevant to the present discussion. 
17 See W. W. Buckland and A. D. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law: A 
Comparison in Outline, 2nd ed. rev. F. H. Lawson, Cambridge 1952, p. 89 (the distinction 
between iura in rem and iura in personam is 'clearly expressed throughout the Roman 
system'.).  In the formulae for actions claiming or denying servitudes, the nature of the right is 
always clear: ius esse or ius non esse.  See D. Mantovani, Le Formule del Processo Privato 
Romano, 2nd ed., Padova 1999, p. 41-44.   
18 In this respect Smith was at a disadvantage, not having the benefit of Gaius' Institutes 
and in particular Gaius' discussion of the legis actio procedure.  On the remedies for 
enforcement of ancient servitudes, see M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, 1, 2nd ed., 
Munich 1971, p. 143; cf. G. Diósdi, Ownership in Ancient and Preclassical Roman Law, 
Budapest 1970, p. 115 (discussing the inadequacy of the legis actio sacramento in rem for 
protecting ancient servitudes).   
19 But see below notes 138 to 144 and accompanying text. 
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some respect between the persons involved20.  Watson says: 'It seems now to 
be completely accepted that the four original servitudes were in early law 
regarded in some way as involving ownership over the objects of the 
servitudes.'21 
  (3)  The Servian action and the quasi-Servian action are miscited by 
Smith22.  These actions relate to pledge and hypothec: the Servian permitted 
the landlord of an agricultural tenant to recover pledged property from third 
persons, while the quasi-Servian extended the protection, eventually to cover 
all property under hypothec23.  Neither action has anything to do with 
servitudes. 
 From the above, we might conclude that Smith did not intend what he 
expressed, but committed an error.  We might, for example, conclude that 
Smith's misunderstanding of the Servian and quasi-Servian actions led him to 
attribute to servitudes what is true only of pledge and hypothec.  I do not 
believe this is what Smith has done, however.  The references to the Servian 
and quasi-Servian actions are of course wrong but, as I suggest below, their 
appearance here is probably the result of Smith misremembering his source, 
rather than a conscious error on his part24.  A second possibility is that Smith 
somehow missed the nuance of 'real servitude' and 'personal servitude', and 
became confused25.  This possibility is supported by a sentence in LJ(A) ii.14, 
quoted above, where Smith says that servitudes are 'either real or personal; i.e. 
as being due by a certain person or by a certain thing'.  But again, I do not 
believe Smith has fallen into this trap either.  Further on in this lecture he 
shows that he understands entirely the nuance of the phrase 'real servitude': 'A 
real servitude, servitus realis, is not a servitude upon a certain thing, for all 
 
20 M. Talamanca, Istituzioni di Diritto Romano, Milan 1990, p. 456-57; Kaser, 
Privatrecht, 1 (supra, n. 18), p. 143; A. Watson, The Law of Property in the Later Roman 
Republic, Oxford 1968, p. 184; H. F. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the 
Study of Roman Law, 3rd ed., Cambridge 1972, p. 158. 
21 Watson, The Law of Property (supra, n. 20), p. 184. 
22 As noted by the editors: see LJ(A), p. 77 n.83. 
23 J. Inst. 4.6.7, 31; D.20.1.10, h.t.21.3, 20.6.4 (Ulpian 73 ed.); D.13.7.28 pr. (Julian 11 
dig.); D.16.1.13.1 (Gaius 9 ed. prov.).  
24 It might be useful here to mention that in LJ(B) 174 there is a somewhat misleading 
abbreviation by the note-taker.  Smith here refers to the ability of a landlord to claim the stock 
of his tenant from any possessor, and because the reference is introduced by the word 
'anciently', this might be taken as a reference to the actio Serviana.  However, a comparison 
with the corresponding passage in the earlier notes, LJ(A) ii.24, shows that he is speaking of 
Scots law. 
25 Perhaps on reading D.8.5.2 pr. (Ulpian 17 ed.): De servitutibus in rem actiones 
conpetunt nobis ad exemplum earum quae ad usum fructum pertinent. 
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servitudes are due in that manner, but a servitude which is due to a person not 
as being such an one but as being the owner of such a farm; it is said to be due 
to such a thing.'26  Several works familiar to Smith also make the distinction 
between real and personal servitudes very clear, and it is hard to believe he 
was not aware of it27.  That in one place the text reads 'due by' rather than 'due 
to' is probably a slip, either Smith's or the note-taker's. 
 Smith's theory of the origin of servitudes, I argue, was conscious and 
deliberate.  We can identify some of the sources for this theory fairly 
confidently, and we can also speculate on the reasons why he adopted this 
theory.  Before discussing these matters I give short description of Smith's 
historical jurisprudence.  
3.  —  Smith's historical jurisprudence 
Smith's historical jurisprudence is based on the idea that a civilization 
provides for its subsistence in a certain way, and that the way it does so 
provokes the creation of certain legal ideas.  This jurisprudence is part of a 
larger historical theory, according to which a civilization progresses from one 
mode of subsistence to another—one 'age' to another—with each age giving 
rise to certain characteristics28.  In Wealth of Nations, for example, he writes 
 
26 LJ(A) ii.52 (emphasis added).  See also LJ(A) ii.37-38, where Smith takes pains to 
distinguish an 'exclusive privilege' from a servitude which, judging by context, is probably a 
personal servitude.  
27 See especially Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis 1.12.8; Gerschom Carmichael, 
Supplementa et Observationes ad Clarissimi Viri Samuelis Pufendorfii Libros Duos De 
Officio Hominis et Civis, Glasgow 1718, p. 142;  Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to 
Moral Philosophy, Glasgow 1747, p. 169; idem, A System of Moral Philosophy, 1, London 
1755, p. 351.  Similarly, Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, Elementa juris civilis secundum ordinem 
Institutionum, 6th ed., Leiden 1751, § 392. 
28 Smith's remarks on the ages of civilisation are included in many places in his works; 
some of the more extended treatments may be found in: LJ(A) i.26-35, iv.1-40; LJ(B) 19-30, 
149-151; WN V.i.a-b.17; Meek, ed., Anderson Notes (supra, n. 1), p. 467-68.  There are also 
some brief remarks on the ages of civilization and division of labour in a fragment of Smith's 
own notes from the 1760s: Adam Smith, First Fragment on the Division of Labour, in: Adam 
Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein, Oxford 
1978, reprinted Indianapolis 1982, p. 583-84.  The subject has been discussed a great deal.  
Meek discusses in detail the development of these ideas over several centuries in Meek, Social 
Science (supra, n. 4).  Some of his account is challenged in P. Stein, The Four Stage Theory of 
the Development of Societies, in: The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law: 
Historical Essays, London 1988, p. 395-409.  Haakonssen discusses Smith's historical 
jurisprudence with special attention to Smith's projected corpus.  Haakonssen, Science (supra, 
n. 6), p. 154-77.  Other treatments may be found in: Campbell, et al., edd., General 
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about how the demands of defence are met differently in different ages, how 
different ages administer justice, and how division of labour differs from age 
to age29.  These ideas are less polished in the jurisprudence lectures, though 
the general scheme is the same: a civilization exists in a certain age, exhibiting 
legal ideas which are in some way appropriate to that age. 
Smith does not argue that a civilization necessarily progresses through 
these ages, or progresses in a certain order30.  How far Smith believed these 
ages determined the lives of those who lived in them is nevertheless a matter 
of debate31.  So far as the law is concerned, the better view is that Smith 
believed certain ages tended to produce certain laws, but many other 
influences were at work as well32, and in any event individuals always retain 
the power to make decisions about the law33.  Smith's scheme is therefore 
'determinative' of the law only in the sense that a given legal idea would not 
arrive until a given age, and it is 'progressive' only in the sense that some legal 
ideas remain and continue to be used in subsequent ages.  His historical 
jurisprudence is therefore not based on the proposition that certain laws are 
 
Introduction, in: Wealth of Nations (supra, n. 8), p. 11-18; Skinner, Historical Theory (supra, 
n. 5), p. 76-105; P. Stein, Adam Smith's Jurisprudence—Between Morality and Economics, in: 
Jubilee Lectures Celebrating the Foundation of the Faculty of Law, University of 
Birmingham, London 1981, p. 142-52; idem, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea, 
Cambridge 1980, p. 29-46.  A good popular treatment is J. Z. Muller, Adam Smith in His Time 
and Ours, Princeton 1993, p. 117-25. 
29 See, respectively, WN V.i.a.1-15, V.i.b.1-17, V.i.f.50-51. 
30 See Skinner, Historical Theory (supra, n. 5), p. 82-83. 
31 Discussed in J. Salter, Adam Smith on Feudalism, Commerce and Slavery, History of 
Political Thought, 13 (1992), p. 219-24.  Salter argues that Smith's account of progress is 
indeed materialistic to a degree, but it is not so determined an account as to leave no room for 
normative laws. 
32 Haakonssen, Science (supra, n. 6), p. 185-89. 
33 Ibid., p. 186 ('. . . although in our social and historical explanations we shall often be 
unable to point out the necessary and sufficient conditions of events, we shall yet be able to 
make these events intelligible by pointing out some of the more or less necessary conditions.'); 
Stein, Adam Smith's Jurisprudence (supra, n. 28), p. 151-52, and especially 152 ('Starting 
from a desire to distinguish what a man can be compelled to do from what he ought to do, he 
was led to the position that what a man can be compelled to do depends on the economic state 
of the society in which he lives.'); A. Fitzgibbons, Adam Smith's System of Liberty, Wealth, 
and Virtue, Oxford 1995, p. 126 ('Smith's theory of history indicated not an inevitable 
economic fate, but the need for moral choice.'); N. MacCormick, Adam Smith on Law, in: K. 
Haakonssen, ed., Adam Smith, Aldershot 1998, p. 200-203, and especially 202 ('The more we 
know and understand of our own circumstances, the more we can make genuinely rational 
choices guided by a well-founded view of individual or of collective interests.').  Cf. J. 
Crospey, Polity and Economy, rev. ed., South Bend 2001, p. 68-69 ('. . . the element of 
rational choice in the process of social evolution is precisely what Smith denies.'). 
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peculiar to certain ages, or that certain ages necessarily produce certain laws, 
or that laws undergo a certain evolution.  It is instead a kind of genetic theory, 
which attempts to explain the origins—some of the origins—of a selection of 
legal ideas by reference to mode of subsistence.  That only a selection of ideas 
is explained in this way requires a brief explanation of Smith's moral theory34. 
Smith accepted that people feel a sense of obligation to do or to refrain 
from certain acts, and he set out to explain how people come to acquire that 
sense of obligation.  He argued that, though people in different times and 
places arrive at different moral judgments, the mechanism by which they 
arrive at those judgments is the same.  The mechanism, which Smith explored 
at length, relies heavily on the idea that people spontaneously experience a 
fellow-feeling or 'sympathy' with other people.  When they see someone doing 
something (good or bad) to another person, they spontaneously imagine 
themselves doing it, and spontaneously weigh the propriety of the act.  
Similarly, they spontaneously imagine themselves the object of the act, and 
consider how they would feel about it.  They then come to a judgment about 
whether the act should be answered by punishment, reward, or indifference.  
Their judgment, however, is not based on fixed criteria or their own 
idiosyncratic feelings, but rather on the experience of having lived in society 
and having been themselves the object of others' sympathetic observations.  
Each person who has himself been an object of these observations has thereby 
received certain ideas of expected behaviour and from them created a second 
self, which Smith called an impartial spectator.  The impartial spectator judges 
others' behaviour on the person's behalf, so to speak, and communicates his 
judgment to the person.  This is Smith's moral theory at its briefest.  For 
present purposes the most important points to take away are that (1) spectator-
sympathy may vary considerably over time and place—only the mechanism 
for making judgments stays the same; and (2) certain injuries tend to be felt 
more keenly, and refraining from these injuries falls within the ambit of 
justice. 
History (and particularly mode of subsistence) sometimes plays a role in 
moral judgment.  This is because what members of a community regard as an 
injustice depends on how spectator-sympathy directs them, and spectator-
sympathy sometimes varies with the circumstances of the spectator.  The way 
 
34 The following account is my own; many good accounts are available.  For concise 
discussions see D. D. Raphael, Adam Smith, in: Concepts of Justice, Oxford 2001, p. 113-25; 
K. Haakonssen, Introduction, in: Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. K. 
Haakonssen, Cambridge 2002, p. vii-xxi.  For a longer, recent discussion see J. R. Otteson, 
Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life, Cambridge 2002, chs. 1-2. 
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in which a community finds its subsistence alters spectator-sympathy in clear 
and observable ways, and therefore provides Smith with a framework for 
explaining why certain historical ages produce certain laws.  Not every 
injustice, however, is so variable: there are some injustices which the spectator 
feels so consistently that the prohibition against them becomes, incidentally, a 
universal, or as close to a universal as Smith's system is capable of creating.  
This is why Smith's ages of civilization explain the genesis of some legal 
ideas, but not all. 
The ages of civilization are: the Age of Hunters, the Age of Shepherds, the 
Age of Agriculture, and the Age of Commerce.  The last of these is not 
relevant to this essay and, in fact, presents unique problems that prevent any 
simple summary35.  The first three are summarized below. 
The Age of Hunters.  Those who live in this age sustain themselves by 
collecting wild fruit, catching wild animals, and fishing36.  The idea of 
'property' in any exclusive sense is almost unknown37.  The inhabitants possess 
the items they have caught or collected, and if someone were to take an item 
directly from another's physical possession, the inhabitants would see the act 
as a transgression.  But taking something that is not in a person's physical 
possession is not seen as a transgression, though it might cause annoyance to 
one who formerly possessed the item or anticipated possessing it.  In this age, 
therefore, 'property' extends no further than possession38.  Moreover, there is 
nothing at this time that one could call 'government'39.  
The Age of Shepherds.  Smith regards the step between the Age of Hunters 
and this age to be the 'greatest in the progress of society'40 because the notion 
of property is no longer limited to possession.  The change comes about 
because, with increasing population, the people who lived by hunting, etc., are 
forced to make more careful provision for their sustenance.  This leads them to 
store goods and eventually to keep and tame animals41.  These are items of 
property which cannot always be in one's immediate possession.  The 
inhabitants therefore naturally come to regard it as a transgression for a person 
to take an item to which another person has established some connection, even 
 
35 See especially Salter, Feudalism, Commerce and Slavery (supra, n. 31), p. 219-24. 
36 LJ(A) i.27-28; LJ(B) 149. 
37 LJ(A) i.44; LJ(B) 150; WN V.i.b.2. 
38 LJ(A) i.41-44, iv.19, 22; LJ(B) 149-150.  See also Meek, ed., Anderson Notes, 
(supra, n. 1), p. 467 (a similar point, but the significance of 'immediate possession' is not made 
out).  
39 LJ(A) iv.4, 6-7, 19; LJ(B) 19-20. 
40 LJ(A) ii.97. 
41 LJ(A) i.28, 44-45; LJ(B) 20, 149. 
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when that item is not in that person's possession42.  In short, property in 
movables is recognized43. 
 The recognition of property in movables is accompanied by the first 
appearance of what may be called government44.  Executive power is 
exercised by those with large possessions45, and there is little or no legislative 
power46.  The judicial power is especially noteworthy, because it develops in 
significant ways over this period of time.  The main point is that, with the 
recognition of property, disputes multiply, and this affects the nature of the 
tribunals.  In the beginning the judicial power is exercised by an assembly of 
the whole people and there are relatively few causes for disputes47.  But in 
time, the number of disputes increases and the judicial power is assumed by 
certain individuals48.  In fact, quite soon after the beginning of this age, 
agreements of various kinds appear: at first, agreements do not sustain any 
action49 but in time testaments, marriage agreements, and other agreements 
concerning property appear50.  Exactly how many of these disputes are heard 
by the tribunals is not clear from Smith's account: the tribunals exist because 
disputes exist, but Smith does say that 'for some time' the judicial power was 
limited 'with regard to the private affairs of individualls'51. 
 The Age of Agriculture.  The hallmark of this age is the recognition of 
property in land52, but it does not come about right away.  The benefits of 
agriculture itself come to a people's attention when they find it difficult to 
sustain themselves by herds and flocks alone, and when they observe that 
seeds produce plants similar to the plants that bore them53.  The land they 
tended would at first be held in common, but as individuals begin to make 
their home in fixed places and collect into cities, the fields they cultivated 
would lie most contiguous to their respective homes.  Then, the leaders of 
 
42 LJ(A) i.45. 
43 LJ(A) i.45-46, iv.43; LJ(B) 150-151; Meek, ed., Anderson Notes (supra, n. 1), 467. 
44 LJ(A) iv.21; LJ(B) 20. 
45 LJ(A) iv.13-14; LJ(B) 20-21. 
46 LJ(A) iv.14-15, 18; LJ(B) 22-23. 
47 LJ(A) iv.9-10; LJ(B) 22. 
48 LJ(A) iv.15-16, 30-31, 34; LJ(B) 26 
49 LJ(A) iv.10. 
50 LJ(A) iv.15, 23; LJ(B) 25. 
51 LJ(A) iv.25; similarly, LJ(A) iv.30; LJ(B) 23-24. 
52 LJ(A) i.51, iv.35; LJ(B) 151; Meek, ed., Anderson Notes (supra, n. 1), p. 467.  
Similarly, Kames, Historical Law-Tracts (supra, n. 4), p. 95; Dalrymple, General History 
(supra, n. 4), p. 77. 
53 LJ(A) i.30-31; LJ(B) 149. 
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these communities would assign portions of land to individuals and families54. 
Smith's moral theory and historical jurisprudence were an innovation to 
the course of Glasgow lectures he inherited, but were nevertheless adaptable to 
the subject.  An earlier holder of Smith's chair, Gershom Carmichael (1672-
1729), had selected Pufendorf's De officio hominis et civis for use in the 'moral 
philosophy' portion of the lectures55, and Pufendorf's distinction between 
duties owed in a 'natural state' and those owed in an 'adventitious state'56 was 
used by Carmichael and his successors, including Smith.  Carmichael had 
inverted Pufendorf's 'duties' into natural and adventitious rights57, a scheme 
 
54 LJ(A) i.50-53; LJ(B) 151.  The particular manner in which these assignments are 
made is discussed below, note 111 and accompanying text. 
55 Carmichael determined that moral philosophy (broadly) at Glasgow would consist of 
lectures in natural theology followed by lectures in moral philosophy based on natural law.  
Carmichael's contributions to the curriculum are discussed in J. Moore and M. Silverthorne, 
Gershom Carmichael and the Natural Jurisprudence Tradition in Eighteenth-Century 
Scotland, in: Wealth and Virtue. The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, ed. I. Hont and M. Ignatieff, Cambridge 1983, p. 74-76; idem, Natural 
Sociability and Natural Rights in the Moral Philosophy of Gerschom Carmichael, in: 
Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. V. Hope, Edinburgh 1984, p. 2; J. W. Cairns, 
Adam Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence: Their Influence on Legal Education, in: Adam 
Smith: International Perspectives, ed. H. Mizuta and C. Sugiyama, Basingstoke 1993, p. 64-
65.  For the course, Carmichael prepared an edition of Pufendorf supplemented with his own 
extensive commentary.  Carmichael, Supplementa (supra, n. 27).  There is a new English 
translation of parts of Carmichael's commentary together with other writings: J. Moore and M. 
Silverthorne, edd., Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The 
Writings of Gershom Carmichael, Indianapolis 2002.  In the preface to his edition of 
Pufendorf, Carmichael explains at length his adoption of natural law as the proper basis of 
moral philosophy.  This preface is translated and included in the new edition, ibid., p. 9-20.  
Pufendorf's natural law continued to influence the Glasgow moral philosophy lectures of 
Carmichael's successor, Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), as well as of Smith, a later holder of 
the chair.  See Cairns, Adam Smith's Lectures, p. 80 n.31; P. Stein, From Pufendorf to Adam 
Smith: The Natural Law Tradition in Scotland, in: The Character and Influence of the Roman 
Civil Law, London 1988, p. 381-93. 
56 According to Pufendorf, when mankind lived in a natural state, each man was 
answerable only to God, not to one another.  See De officio hominis et civis 2.1.5, 8.  Nothing 
belonged to one person any more than to another.  Ibid., 1.12.2.  In time, items in lesser 
abundance come to be divided, with agreements (sometimes tacit) used to divide ownership.  
The duties created by these agreements are adventitious, which is to say, 'man-made'.  This 
progress from so-called 'negative' to 'positive' community is described in ibid., 1.12.2, 4; idem, 
De jure naturae et gentium 4.4.14.  See also S. Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of 
Property, Oxford 1991, p. 97-100; J. Kilcullen and J. Scott, A Translation of William of 
Ockham's Work of Ninety Days, New York 2001, p. 917-20 (Appendix 2: 'The Origin of 
Property: Ockham, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Some Others').  The last cited essay discusses at 
length the antecedents to Pufendorf's theory of property.     
57 See Moore and Silverthorne, Natural Sociability (supra, n. 55), p. 6-8. 
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continued by Hutcheson, and Smith did not need to disturb the categories; he 
simply gave them new meanings58.  As discussed above, to Smith human 
nature reckons all rights by the same mechanism.  Accordingly, the 
psychological forces which determine the content of any right is the same, 
whether the right is natural or adventitious.  What varies is the certainty of the 
content.  Man's psychology, for whatever reason, consistently recognizes 
certain rights as compelling; these are 'natural'.  Other rights may be no less 
compelling, and their violation no less unjust, but their content is not so 
certain because circumstances alter it; these are 'adventitious'.  The distinction 
itself is perhaps not very important in Smith's jurisprudence59, but the really 
striking thing is what Smith has done with these ordinary categories.  A person 
who came to hear or read Smith's treatment for the first time would probably 
have assumed that natural rights deserved and would receive the lion's share 
of attention for being natural and, so to speak, scientific, the other rights being 
merely 'man-made'.  But Smith announces instead that he will make a 
scientific study of the man-made rights: a close study of their history can 
reveal some of their causes, in the same way one uncovers causes in the 
physical sciences.  This must have been quite a surprising change of emphasis, 
and of course signalled Smith's break with his Glasgow predecessors. 
4.  —  Model rights and historical rights 
I argue below that Smith had difficulty fitting the law of servitudes into his 
historical jurisprudence, or more specifically, that he had difficulty explaining 
its genesis.  To make the argument clear I must say something further about 
Smith's treatment of rights.  His jurisprudence, as just discussed, is a historical 
account of the development of rights, but in his account a right can be two 
very different things, and the distinction is important for purposes of the 
present discussion.  He can speak of a right (such as a property right or a 
contractual right) in a general way, abstracted from any legal system, as in the 
statement 'Private property in land never begins till a division be made from 
common agreement . . . .'60  But he can also speak of a right historically, that 
 
58 See K. Haakonssen, Adam Smith Out of Context: His Theory of Rights in Prussian 
Perspective, in: Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, Cambridge 1996, p. 130-34; idem, 
Science (supra, n. 6), p. 100-103. 
59 Haakonssen suggests the distinction was used by Smith to emphasize to his students 
that some rights are more dependent on history than others.  Haakonssen, Science (supra, n. 
6), p. 102. 
60 LJ(B) 151. 
PREPRINT 
15 E. Metzger IusCivile.com 
 
is, a right as it actually exists or existed in a given legal system: 'By the civil 
law the first promises that sustained action were those entered into in presence 
of a court . . . .'61  The first, 'abstracted' right is a kind of model: whether a 
person possesses a right of this kind depends on whether the right corresponds 
to an 'injury', as defined in Smith's theory of morals.  Certain injuries (and 
therefore rights) are good for all time (natural), because spectator-sympathy 
always recognizes them as such, while other injuries depend on the 
circumstances (adventitious)62.  In either case, these model rights serve Smith's 
argument in two ways: (1) they allow Smith to speculate about the 
development of historical rights whose history is otherwise unknown, and (2) 
they reveal how some historical rights have deviated from the model63. 
 Smith begins by setting out the model rights he intends to discuss64.  Both 
courses of lectures (the second less so than the first65) follow to some degree 
an outline taken from Hutcheson, who himself followed an outline in the 
tradition of Grotius and Pufendorf66.  A man can be injured in three different 
ways: 
1. as a man 
2. as a member of a family (adventitious) 
3. as a citizen or member of a state (adventitious) 
The first of these is subdivided further. 
1. as a man, in one of three respects: 
a. in his person (natural) 
b. in his reputation (natural) 
 
61 LJ(B) 177. 
62 On natural and adventitious rights in Smith's system, see Haakonssen, Science 
(supra, n. 6), 100-103.  There is quite a different use of 'natural' in Smith's works: his 'natural 
jurisprudence' is an attempt to set out principles of moral decision-making, principles which, 
though 'natural' and remaining the same, produce results that are to some degree historically 
determined.  See K. Haakonssen, What Might Properly be Called Natural Jurisprudence?, in: 
K. Haakonssen, ed., Adam Smith, Aldershot 1998, p. 176-78; Stein, Legal Evolution (supra, 
n. 6), p. 44-46. 
63 TMS VII.iv.36: 'In no country do the decisions of positive law coincide exactly, in 
every case, with the rules which the natural sense of justice would dictate.  Systems of positive 
law, therefore, though they deserve the greatest authority, as the records of the sentiments of 
mankind in different ages and nations, yet can never be regarded as accurate systems of the 
rules of natural justice.' 
64 The outline is discussed in detail in Haakonssen, Science (supra, n. 6), ch. 5. 
65 See Meek, ed., Anderson Notes (supra, n. 1), p. 461-66. 
66 Haakonssen, Adam Smith Out of Context, (supra, n. 58), p. 130. 
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c. in his estate  (adventitious) 
The injuries a man may suffer 'as a man' cover much of private law, including 
injury to the body, restriction on freedom, affront to reputation, as well as 
property and contract rights.  This outline, though borrowed by Smith from his 
predecessors, fits his theory of morals extremely well.  The first two injuries a 
man may suffer as a man—in his person, in his reputation—are 'natural' for 
Smith as they had been for Hutcheson67.  In Smith's case, this is because these 
kinds of injuries receive a more determinate measure of spectator-sympathy, 
as Smith makes clear in The Theory of Moral Sentiments68: 
The most sacred laws of justice, therefore, those whose violation seems to call loudest for 
vengeance and punishment, are the laws which guard the life and person of our 
neighbour; the next are those which guard his property and possessions; and last of all 
come those which guard what are called his personal rights, or what is due to him from 
the promises of others. 
For example, when a man strikes another man, the quality of the injury is such 
that spectator-sympathy always recognizes it as an injury.  Neither 'mode of 
subsistence' nor, one presumes, any other factor, will alter the fact that an 
'injury' has taken place.  It is 'non-contingent'69.  All of the other rights in the 
outline are adventitious.  They are measured by the same spectator-sympathy 
as the natural rights, the only difference being that the spectator, when placed 
in different circumstances, will judge the injury differently.  Spectator-
sympathy in the Age of Hunters is different from spectator-sympathy in the 
Age of Shepherds, and the injuries recognized in each age will differ 
accordingly.  Adventitious rights are in this respect 'contingent'70. 
 These are what I call model rights.  The literature on Smith does not 
ordinarily distinguish model rights from historical rights, but I do so here, not 
to complicate things, but to highlight an important part of Smith's project.  
 
67 Francis Hutcheson, Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria, 2nd ed., Glasgow 
1745, book 2, ch. 4; idem, System (supra, n. 27), book 2, ch. 5; idem, Short Introduction 
(supra, n. 27), p. 141-43. 
68 TMS II.ii.2.2. 
69 This description of natural and adventitious rights in most respects follows 
Haakonssen (supra, n. 6), p. 100-103.  I prefer 'non-contingent' to, e.g., 'non-historical', to 
make clear that natural rights are perhaps independent not only of mode of subsistence, but 
non-historical factors as well: fortune, rank, etc.  
70 The question 'exactly what are they contingent on?' would return us to the matter of 
determinism, see notes 30 to 33 and accompanying text.  That adventitious rights are to some 
degree contingent on history is clear, but I cannot otherwise attempt to answer this question 
here.  
PREPRINT 
17 E. Metzger IusCivile.com 
 
Historical rights are marked by historical accidents and carry refinements the 
legal system saw fit to add for whatever reason.  A legal system can put a 
number of different rights under a single rubric (consider, e.g., what falls 
under Roman 'accession'), and it can classify a right in any number of unusual 
ways.  This means that when Smith attempts to classify, e.g., Roman-law 
rights according to his system, he cannot always accept the way the sources 
have chosen to characterize those rights.  He must sometimes accommodate 
the historical data to the model by looking behind the forms.  This does not 
detract from the enterprise in any way, quite the opposite: it is a necessary step 
in demonstrating how historical rights developed, and it shows off Smith's 
critical powers71. 
 Smith's discussion of hereditas—a historical right—is an example.  Smith 
introduces hereditas among three other real rights (dominium, servitus, 
pignus)72, but tells us right away that his interest in it is limited.  The rights of 
an heir after he has entered into an inheritance, Smith says, are not different in 
quality from the rights of his predecessor.  But before the heir has entered into 
the inheritance, and while he is deciding whether to accept it, this 'real right' 
takes on a special character and can be reckoned what Smith calls an 
'exclusive privilege'.  In this respect it is like a monopoly, an intellectual 
property right, or other 'option' granted to certain individuals to the exclusion 
of others.  Hence Smith chooses to speak of 'exclusive privilege', instead of 
hereditas, as the fourth category of real rights73.  At this point a reader might 
expect to find that the right of the heir, being a 'real right', is a right that a man 
enjoys 'as a man, in his estate', and is therefore adventitious according to the 
system of rights.  But this is not the case: though most exclusive privileges 
owe their existence to civil government and are therefore adventitious, the 
privilege of the heir who has not yet entered into the inheritance is a natural 
 
71 In two places in the earlier set of notes, there is some genuine ambiguity about 
historical and model rights.  In the first, LJ(A) i.12-13, Smith seems to say that a certain litany 
of natural rights can be 'reduced to the three above mentioned', ostensibly referring to the 
three ways a man may be injured 'as a man'.  If taken literally this means that the rights of a 
man in his estate are natural.  From context, however, it is clear that 'three' is a slip for 'two' 
and that 'estate' is excluded from natural rights.  In the second passage, LJ(A) i.24, however, 
Smith makes this statement: 'The only case where the origin of naturall rights is not altogether 
plain, is in that of property.'  Haakonssen takes this as a mistake by the student, Haakonssen, 
Science (supra, n. 6), p. 205 n.10, but the statement is a correct one, so long as we take Smith 
to mean 'Some rights which legal systems treat as property rights are in fact natural.'  
72 LJ(A) i.19-20, ii.26-41; LJ(B) 9-10, 174-175. 
73 LJ(A) i.19-20, ii.27-28; LJ(B) 8, 9-10, 149, 174-175.  In the second course of 
lectures, the transformation is complete, and Smith no longer speaks of hereditas as the fourth 
real right at all, but as an example of exclusive privilege. 
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right.  It is analogous, according to Smith, to the right of a man who is 
pursuing a wild animal but has not yet brought it into his possession; another 
may not step in and take it74.  This is not, Smith insists, a breach of property, 
but it is an injury all the same75; Smith would presumably class both rights as 
among a man's (natural) right to liberty, or some other right belonging to 'a 
man, in his person'. 
 This is an example of Smith's method: he examines various rights as a 
legal system presents them, and by careful analysis shows what underlies the 
superficialities.  Historical rights are broken down and fitted into the model.  
In the example just given, Smith shows how a natural right lies hidden in the 
Roman law of property. One should note, however, that it is not one of Smith's 
principal tasks to uncover natural rights and distinguish them from 
adventitious ones: he is far more concerned with adventitious rights alone76.  
He is particularly concerned to show in what respect an adventitious right is 
adventitious, by uncovering what circumstances—above all, mode of 
subsistence—provoked a given right to be recognized.  This requires him to 
examine the historical rights, break them down, and assign the individual parts 
to one or another historical age. 
 The best example of this is Smith's treatment of occupation.  It is treated in 
both sets of lecture notes, but much more thoroughly in the earlier.  The 
various rules by which a person acquires ownership by occupation are 
considered separately and assigned a place chronologically. 
In the Age of Hunters: 
(1)  At first, ownership is not acquired until actual possession is acquired, 
and a mere expectation that something will come into one's possession is not 
enough to engage the sympathy of the spectator77.  Under these conditions 
ownership is lost when possession is lost78. 
(2)  But in time, the sympathy of the spectator broadened, so that even 
when possession, once obtained, was temporarily lost, the (former) possessor 
 
74 LJ(A) i. 20, ii.28-29; LJ(B) 9-10, 174. 
75 LJ(A) ii.28-29; LJ(B) 174 (editors' emendation).  See also LJ(A) i.41-42, 43-44 
(same point made in discussion of occupation). 
76 Haakonssen, Science (supra, n. 6), p. 103. 
77 LJ(A) i.37-40; 42-43. 
78 LJ(A) i.41: 'At first property was conceived to end as well as to begin with 
possession.  They conceived that a thing was no longer ours in any way after we had lost the 
immediate property of it.'  LJ(B) 150: 'Among savages property begins and ends with 
possession . . . .'  In the same passage, however, Smith notes that some 'lawyers' have regarded 
it as a breach of property to intervene in the chase of a wild beast that another has started. 
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was still regarded as having some sort of claim so long as he had some hope of 
recovering the thing79. 
In the Age of Shepherds: 
(3)  When people began to keep animals, a class of animals arose 
('mansuefactae [naturae]') which return to their possessor even when let out of 
his power: these came to be regarded as owned by the possessor80.  At the very 
beginning of this time (with which the Age of Shepherds begins), all animals 
would be either mansuefactae or ferae.  When properly tamed (mansuetae) 
animals appear, they are treated as owned by their possessor in the same way 
as animals mansuefactae with a habit of returning81. 
(4)  'But in process of time, when some species of animalls came to be 
nowhere met but in the state of mansuefactae, they lost that name and became 
mansuetae.'82  This brings about a 'great extention of the notion of property', 
because an animal which had been out of a person's power for a long time 
could be regarded as belonging to that person still, so long as that person could 
be distinguished in some way as its master83. 
Smith is here taking a specific historical right—the right to property by 
occupation in Roman law—and, by considering where spectator-sympathy 
would lie, attributing individual rules to different historical ages.  He does the 
same elsewhere; in the case of contract, for example, he says that the first 
periods of society did not perceive that an injury took place when a person 
broke his promise, and even when spectator-sympathy did first acknowledge 
the injury, it acknowledged it only in the case of verborum obligationes, where 
the expectations of the parties were clear84.  Delict likewise gives Smith an 
opportunity to attribute certain rights to certain ages85. 
 
79 LJ(A) i.41, 43-44. 
80 LJ(A) i.44-46. 
81 LJ(A) i.45-46. 
82 LJ(A) i.46. 
83 LJ(A) i.46, iv.21; LJ(B) 151. 
84 LJ(A) ii.46-49, 56-63; LJ(B) 176-177.  This is discussed in Stein, Adam Smith's 
Theory of Law and Society (supra, n. 7), p. 267; idem, Adam Smith's Jurisprudence (supra, n. 
28), p. 149; MacCormick, Adam Smith on Law (supra, n. 33), p. 204-205. 
85 See Cairns, Adam Smith's Lectures (supra, n. 55), p. 70-71.  Delict is historically a 
division of 'obligations', which means (historical) delictual rights fall under rights that belong 
to a man in his estate.  See LJ(A) ii.88; LJ(B) 181.  The Romans of course treated under delict 
many acts which we treat as crimes, and it is therefore no surprise that Smith treats crimes in 
this section.  Some of these historical rights are nevertheless 'natural'.  See, e.g., LJ(A) ii.93.  
When Cairns says that Smith treated these natural rights as injuries to estate for 'ease of 
exposition', Cairns, Adam Smith's Lectures (supra, n. 55), p. 71, he is essentially right.  The 
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Appreciating the nature of this exercise is important for understanding 
Smith's treatment of servitudes, to which I now return. 
5.  —  The sources of Smith's account of servitudes 
To recall: Smith argued that servitudes originally gave rise to personal 
rights.  I suggested above that Smith deliberately adopted this view and did not 
wander into it by mistake.  Here I set out what I believe are two of his sources.  
The first, I believe, was his principal source. 
1.  Samuel von Cocceji, Introductio ad Grotium Illustratum (1748) 
Smith included Samuel von Cocceji (1679-1755) among a small number of 
writers whose jurisprudence he regarded as 'of note'86.  He says: 'There are five 
volumes in folio of his works published, many of which are very ingenious 
and distinct, especially those which treat of laws.'87  Whether Smith intended 
the last clause as a kind of joke is not clear; I tend to read it as a dig at 
Cocceji's natural law.  It is also not clear whether Smith confused the son with 
the father (the son having both annotated the father's works on Grotius and 
added twelve dissertationes of his own)88.  In the earlier course of lectures 
Smith cites Cocceji only once89, though the editors have pointed out other 
places where Cocceji's influence might be present.  From the comment just 
quoted it seems certain at least that Smith admired Cocceji. 
 The passage which I believe was Smith's principal source for his treatment 
of servitudes is in the twelfth dissertatio in Cocceji's Introductio90.  The 
 
specific reason, however, is that historical rights largely dictate the organization of this part of 
Smith's lecture. 
86 LJ(B) 4.  He cites Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and 'Baron de Cocceii'.  LJ(B) 1-4. 
87 LJ(B) 4. 
88 The notes of the second course of Smith's lectures, from which the quoted statement 
is taken, do not always reproduce Smith's words verbatim: the notes have undergone some 
rewriting and often summarize matters which the earlier set of notes describes more fully.  See 
Meek, et al., edd., Lectures on Jurisprudence (supra, n. 1), Introduction, p. 6-7.  The works of 
father and son could easily have been conflated in the rewriting.  
89 LJ(A) i.87, on prescription. 
90 Samuel L. B. von Cocceji, Introductio ad Henrici L. B. Cocceii . . . Grotium 
Illustratum, continens dissertationes prooemiales, Halle 1748, Diss. XII, 4.3.6 (§§ 302-305).  
The twelfth dissertatio is a re-publication of a 1740 work, Elementa jurisprudentiae naturalis 
et romanae which, after its inclusion in the Introductio, appeared again as a single volume in 
1750 under the title Novum systema jurisprudentiae naturalis et romanae.  See Allgemeine 
Deutsche Biographie, 4, Leipzig 1876, p. 374 (a slightly different publication history—
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dissertatio is titled 'Systema de iustitia naturali et romana', and the relevant 
section is titled 'Ubi probatur, servitutes natura non esse jus in re'.  The text 
and a translation are set out as an appendix to this essay.  Cocceji's argument, 
very briefly, is that both personal and predial servitudes, by natural law, gave 
rise only to personal rights and were therefore effective only between the 
agreeing parties, but that the civil law made these rights real.  His arguments 
are of two kinds, formal and practical.  His formal argument is that the 
agreements which the Roman jurists chose to treat as servitudes are only a 
selection of a broader class of similar agreements, and that many agreements 
in this broader class gave rise only to personal rights: this shows that the 
jurists selected the agreements we now call servitudes, and gave them special 
treatment91.  His practical argument is that, so long as servitudes gave rise 
only to personal actions, they were inconvenient to the owner of the servitude.  
Two different points fall under this head.  (1) If the burdened property were 
sold, the benefits of the servitude came to an end.  (2) If a third person 
disturbed the owner of the servitude, that owner could sue only the owner of 
the servient estate, who in turn would have to sue the disturber, or cede the 
claim to the servitude owner92. 
 The general message of Smith's account is of course the same as that of 
Cocceji's account: all servitudes once gave rise only to personal rights but 
were subsequently made real.  What is largely missing in Smith's account is 
something we would not, in any event, expect to see; where Cocceji argues 
that servitudes were 'by nature' personal, Smith mostly argues that they were 
 
perhaps more accurate than that given in the ADB—is given by Haakonssen, Adam Smith Out 
of Context (supra, n. 58), p. 137 & n.31).  Which of these works Smith in fact relied on is not 
clear, though the Introductio was in Smith's library.  See Hiroshi Mizuta, Adam Smith's 
Library. A Catalogue, Oxford 2000, p. 59.  Cocceji's argument in the Introductio expands on a 
remark he appended to his father's commentary on Grotius.  See Heinrich von Cocceji, 
Grotius Illustratus, seu commentarii ad Hugonis Grotii de jure belli et pacis libros tres, 1, 
Wratislava 1744, p. 79 (at Grotius 1.1.4): Jure naturae servitutes non pertinent ad jura realia, 
sed omne jus hic oritur ex pacto, unde tantum oritur obligatio personalis. 
91 This is my own fuller account of what I take to be Cocceji's formal argument.  See 
Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 303, and especially § 305 (Jurisconsulti Romani quatuor 
saltem casibus usum rei alienae inter jura in re retulerunt. . . .  Cum igitur saltem in quatuor 
illis casibus specialibus constitutum sit, ut actio realis detur, non in aliis, (ubi tamen eadem 
juris naturalis ratio est,) hae ipsae exceptiones probant, constitutionem illam esse mere 
civilem.).  A second formal argument, put forward for real servitudes only, is that when certain 
restrictions on servitudes are ignored, a personal action remains.  Ibid., § 304 (Hanc autem . . . 
manet.). 
92 Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 304 (Hac forma posita . . . cedere debet) (real 
servitudes), § 305 (Nam hoc quoque . . . possessori servitutis) (personal servitudes). 
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'originally' personal93.  Aside from the general message, some of Cocceji's 
points have found their way into Smith's account. 
 (1) Smith may have adopted part of Cocceji's formal argument.  In the 
earlier set of notes Smith says that all burdens on property must have 'taken 
their rise' from a contract, and 'must originally have been personall . . . for a 
contract can produce nothing but a personall right'94, and this closely 
resembles Cocceji's 'servitus sua natura nihil aliud est, quam pactum . . . , ex 
omni autem pacto saltem oritur actio personalis'95.  (2) Smith's debt to Cocceji 
is clearer when we look at Cocceji's practical arguments.  Like Cocceji, Smith 
attributes the reform to unnamed 'legislators'96.  Smith's words, 'induced 
legislators to make them real, and claimable a quocumque possessore', closely 
recall Cocceji's words, 'actionem realem dedere Legislatores Romani praedio 
dominanti, ejusque possessori, ut servitutem a quocunque possessore vindicare 
possit'97.  The reason why these legislators undertook the reform is again 
similar in the two accounts, but surprisingly it is the differences rather than the 
similarities which prove the connection.  The two accounts are the same on the 
main point: the utility of a servitude is easily lost if it gives rise only to a 
personal right and the servitude owner cannot sue the offender directly.  The 
utility can be regained only by a succession of personal actions (Smith: 
'multiplicity of actions'; Cocceji: 'ambages'98) or by the person who is bound to 
the servitude owner ceding his right of action to that owner (Smith: 'oblige 
him to cede to him the obligation'; Cocceji: '[dominus praedii servientis 
actionem] cedere deberet'99).  But in the detail these two account are somewhat 
different.  As mentioned above, Cocceji describes two alternative 
circumstances in which the utility of a predial or personal servitude is lost.  In 
the first, the owner of the burdened property becomes an offender by 
 
93 Smith's historical jurisprudence is of course inconsistent with the idea of a 'state of 
nature', as he points out in LJ(B) 3.  Nevertheless, in one passage the notes record that 
servitudes 'are all naturaly personal rights'.  LJ(B) 172.  
94 LJ(A) ii.19. 
95 Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 303.  There is, however, nothing in Smith like 
Cocceji's argument that predial servitudes are by nature personal because a personal action 
remains when the servitude breaches certain requirements. 
96 LJ(B) 9; cf. Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), §§ 304, 305.  See also LJ(A) ii.37 
('by the determination of the legislature').  On the identity of these legislators, see note 162 
below. 
97 LJ(B) 9; Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 304. 
98 LJ(A) ii.16; Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 305.  
99 LJ(A) ii.16; Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), § 304.  The phrase actionem cedere 
debere is found in the Digest (see D.43.18.1.1 (Ulpian 70 ed.)), so Smith did not necessarily 
get it from Cocceji.  
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alienating the property; in the second, a third person is the offender and the 
servitude owner is forced into a circuit of actions.  Unfortunately, it is not 
immediately clear from Cocceji's Latin that these are alternatives: he joins the 
two with only sed and a reader is apt to read the second alternative as a 
continuation of the first100.  This in fact is what Smith has done: he has 
conflated the two examples and taken Cocceji to mean that the turbans of the 
second is the buyer of the first.  To give any sense to Smith's argument, 
however, the buyer-turbans must be bound by contract to observe the 
servitude, and thus Smith adds a new fact, that the owner of the servient estate 
'take the purchaser bound to grant [the servitude owner] the liberty 
stipulated'101.  The result is a somewhat contrived example, where successive 
sellers and buyers carefully observe the servitude in their contract terms, but a 
single buyer nevertheless impedes the servitude.  The case for law reform is 
perhaps not so pressing here.  In any event, the nature of the discrepancy 
between Smith's single example and Cocceji's two-fold example demonstrates 
Smith's debt to Cocceji in an interesting way.  The nature of the discrepancy, 
moreover, shows that the two writers are not themselves indebted to some 
third source. 
 Smith's reliance on Cocceji also explains how Smith came to miscite the 
Servian and quasi-Servian actions in LJ(A) ii.16.  In the section immediately 
following the section on servitudes, Cocceji speaks very briefly about pledge 
('Ubi demonstratur, per pignus naturali ratione non constitui jus aliquod in 
re')102.  Smith's account of pledge is again very similar to Cocceji's103.  It is in 
this section that Cocceji mentions how first the Servian and then the quasi-
Servian made the rights of the creditor real104.  It is reasonable to infer that 
Smith, having consulted Cocceji's accounts of both servitudes and pledge, 
misattributed part of the second account to the first. 
2.  Lord Kames, Historical Law-Tracts (1758) 
Lord Kames (1696-1782) was sponsor, adviser, and friend to Smith for 
 
100 In his account of both predial and personal servitudes, Cocceji introduces the second 
alternative with sed et si; he possibly had in mind a German word with a more disjunctive 
force (außerdem? dennoch?) not carried by sed. 
101 LJ(A) ii.15. 
102 Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), Diss. XII, 4.3.7 (§§ 306-308).   
103 Cf. Ibid., § 306, with LJ(A) ii.19-20.  Both authors repeat the 'circuit of actions' 
argument. 
104 Cocceji, Introductio (supra, n. 90), §§ 307, 308. 
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much of Smith's professional life105, and parts of his Historical Law-Tracts 
share the spirit of Smith's historical jurisprudence106.  The third tract is titled 
'History of Property'.  In the relevant passage107 Kames is discussing the 
relation of property and possession, and in particular the proposition that 
property was not always acquired with possession.  This leads to a discussion 
of theft, and remedies for pursuing the person into whose hands stolen goods 
have fallen.  In a lengthy footnote to this discussion108, he discusses the 
development of certain relevant Roman institutions, in particular the condictio 
furtiva, restitutio in integrum, and the actio metus.  The last of these was 
available against a good-faith possessor, and so, in Kames' opinion, was 
hardly different from rei vindicatio.  He then writes:109 
Hence it is, that, in the Roman Law, the actio metus is classed under a species 
denominated, Actiones in rem scriptae, a species which has puzzled all the commentators, 
and which none of them have been able to explain. . . .  All actions pass under that name, 
which, originally personal, were,  by the augmented vigour of the relation of property, 
made afterwards real. 
 We also discover from the Roman law, that other real rights made a progress similar 
to that mentioned concerning property.  There was, for example, in the Roman law no real 
action originally for recovering a pledge, when the creditor, by accident or otherwise, had 
lost the possession.  It was the Pretor Servius who gave a real action. 
There are no real similarities of language between Kames and Smith; what 
recommends this as a source is the fact that, like Cocceji, Kames discusses the 
general progress of personal rights into real rights, and that he joins to the 
discussion a reference to the Servian action.  This passage, along with 
Cocceji's account of pledge, may also have prompted Smith to misremember 
the proper context of the Servian and quasi-Servian actions.  
6.  —  The problem 
Why did Smith adopt Cocceji's argument?  He does not tell us, and it is 
possible of course that he was simply persuaded by what Cocceji had written.  
 
105 I. S. Ross, Lord Kames and the Scotland of his Day, Oxford 1972, p. 91-95; W. C. 
Lehmann, Henry Home, Lord Kames, and the Scottish Enlightenment, The Hague 1971, p. 61. 
106 Kames' attitude to the growth of law and its foundation in morals is discussed in 
Ross, Lord Kames (supra, n. 105), p. 202-21.  Historical Law-Tracts was in Smith's library.  
Mizuta, Adam Smith's Library (supra, n. 90), p. 137. 
107 Kames, Historical Law-Tracts (supra, n. 4), p. 83-88. 
108 Ibid., p. 85-88 note. 
109 Ibid., 87-88 note.  On metus and 'actio in rem scripta', see D.4.2.9.8 (Ulpian 11 ed.). 
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But that Smith needed the argument is easily shown.  The problem, very 
briefly, is that it would have been difficult for Smith to include servitudes in 
his historical jurisprudence if he had relied uncritically on their treatment in 
the Roman sources.  Roman law of course treats predial servitudes and certain 
personal servitudes as rights in the immoveable property of another110.  In 
Smith's jurisprudence, the existence of immoveable property presumes that a 
civilization is moderately advanced: immoveable property is not recognized 
until the Age of Agriculture.  The difficulty arises because in practice the idea 
of a servitude is simpler than its many refinements make it appear, and in 
Smith's historical jurisprudence the idea is needed, and urgently so, before 
property in immoveables is recognized.  There are two areas of conflict, or 
more accurately, two areas where Smith may have tried to mend a conflict.  
The first is not serious and I mention it only as a possibility. 
 According to Smith, property in land was introduced in the Age of 
Agriculture by a gradual process111.  First, the community as a whole gave to 
individuals particular rights over the surface: the right to plough, sow, reap the 
fruits, and pasture.  In time, the possessors of these rights came to be regarded 
as the owners of the surface.  Finally, by accession the remainder of the land—
the trees, stones, minerals—became the property of the owner of the surface.  
This evolutionary account is interesting and even credible, but it is 
nevertheless impossible to reconcile with the Roman sources.  The order of 
events (limited surface rights, then a general proprietary right in the land) is 
essentially an argument that servitudes preceded land ownership, and is 
therefore at odds with the usual account of, e.g., the right to take the fruits of 
the land, or the right to pasture, which presume the prior existence of land 
ownership.  This poses a problem for Smith: because some of these limited 
surface rights are what we regard as servitudes, Smith perhaps did not wish to 
leave unchallenged the suggestion that servitudes were always rights in the 
immoveable property of another.  Cocceji's account of the origin of servitudes 
would solve the problem, because personal rights avoid any implication of 
property in land. 
 This is the lesser of Smith's problems, however: predial servitudes alone 
will have caused him genuine trouble.  This is because, if we follow Smith's 
account, something like predial servitudes were needed before the Age of 
 
110 See, e.g., J. Inst. 2.3.3, 2.4.2; D.8.1.3 (Paul 21 ed.); D.8.2.2 (Gaius 7 ed. prov.); 
D.7.1.3 pr. (Gaius 2 rerum cott.). 
111 For this account, see LJ(A) i.66; LJ(B) 152.  The account of the development of 
property in land in the Anderson Notes is quite different: see Meek, ed., Anderson Notes 
(supra, n. 1), p. 467 (labour expended on the area about the house causes neglect of public 
fields). 
PREPRINT 
26 E. Metzger IusCivile.com 
 
Agriculture had even begun.  In the Age of Shepherds, animals are the 
principal item of wealth.  Animals also happen to be one of the principal 
subjects of the law of predial servitudes: neighbours typically have to make 
accommodations with one another about the drawing of water and the driving 
and pasturing of animals.  We might therefore presume that, from time to time, 
neighbours in the Age of Shepherds would require something like a servitude 
so that one neighbour could, e.g., drive his animals over his neighbour's land.  
But there is a problem here: if ownership of land was not recognized in the 
Age of Shepherds, then there is no such thing as 'neighbour's land', no basis 
for ownership rights to be relaxed, and thus no opportunity for these 
accommodations ever to arise112.  In other words, these accommodations were 
badly needed, and yet unavailable. 
Smith, I suggest, recognized the problem, but recognized also that to put 
the problem this way relied overmuch on the developed law.  Disputes about 
pasturing, driving, and watering animals, and the accommodations needed to 
resolve these disputes, would arise wherever land is possessed: ownership is 
not essential.  In the first course of lectures, we notice, he gives examples of 
servitudes between neighbouring possessors rather than owners, and in fact 
speaks more frequently of possessors than owners, e.g.113: 
. . . the possessor of [one] farm should have the liberty of a road thro the farm of his 
neighbour.  This he may obtain for a certain gratuity from the possessor; and take his 
obligation to grant him that liberty in time to come.  This would be given him not as being 
such a man but as being possessor of such a farm . . . . 
It is clear, moreover, that inhabitants of the Age of Shepherds, though not 
owners of land, do possess pieces of land for themselves and their animals114: 
 
112 Haakonssen, Natural Jurisprudence (supra, n. 62), p. 177:  '. . . there can hardly be 
disputes over property in land as long as a society has not got the idea that land is the sort of 
thing which can be owned; and consequently even the most exemplary application of the 
principles of the impartial spectator will not by itself extend the law of property to land.' 
113 LJ(A) ii.14-15.  In the second set of lectures this is not so clear.  The language is 
often ambiguous as to whether the neighbours own or only possess the land, but the 
illustrations are not reproduced very fully. 
114 LJ(A) i.48-49.  The version in LJ(B) 150-151 is much abbreviated.  See also 
Dalrymple, General History (supra, n. 4), p. 76: 
During this period [sc. pasturage], as soon as a flock have brouzed upon one spot of 
ground, their proprietors will remove them to another; and the place they have quitted will 
fall to the next who pleases to take possession of it: For this reason such shepherds will 
have no notion of property in immoveables, nor of right of possession longer than the act 
of possession last. 
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The life of a shepherd requires that he should frequently change his situation, or at least 
the place of his pasturing, to find pasture for his cattle.  The property of the spot he built 
on would be conceived to end as soon as he had left it, in the same manner as the seats in 
a theatre or a hut on the shore belong no longer to any person than they are possessed by 
him.  They would not easily conceive a subject of such extent as land is, should belong to 
an object so little as a single man.  It would more easily be conceived that a large body 
such as a whole nation should have property in land.  Accordingly we find that in many 
nations the different tribes have each their peculiar territory on which the others dare not 
encroach (as the Tartars and inhabitants of the coast of Guinea).  But here the property is 
conceived to continue no longer in a private person than he actually possessed the 
subject.  A field that had been pastured on by one man would be considered to be his no 
longer than he actually staid on it. 
In short, the possession of neighbouring lands would have required neighbours 
to make agreements with each other, particularly agreements in the nature of 
actus, aquae haustus, and ius pascendi115.  Agreements of various kinds 
existed in the Age of Shepherds, as already discussed116.  The obstacle was in 
the Roman sources: if Smith relied on them uncritically, he would have to 
accept that the inhabitants of the Age of Shepherds were incapable of making 
these kinds of agreements, because immoveable property was not yet 
recognized.  Therefore to avoid the objection that servitudes could not have 
existed in this age, presuming as they do the existence of immoveable 
property, he put forward the explanation that servitudes originally gave rise 
only to personal rights. 
7.  —  Progress of Smith's views 
The progress of Smith's views on servitudes can be described to some 
extent, though only tentatively.  In the earlier course of lectures, Smith 
summarizes how he intends to discuss servitudes in a later lecture.  But the 
account he gives here is not the same as the account he eventually gave; it is 
instead an entirely conventional one117: 
Property is to be considered as an exclusive right by which we can hinder any other 
person from using in any shape what we possess in this manner.  A man for instance who 
possesses a farm of land can hinder any other not only from intermedling with any of the 
products but from walking across his field.  'Tis from the relaxation or yielding up some 
part of this exclusive right in favours of a particular person that the right of servitudes has 
arose. 
 
115 J. Inst. 2.3 pr., 2. 
116 Above, notes 49 to 50 and accompanying text. 
117 LJ(A) i.17-18. 
PREPRINT 
28 E. Metzger IusCivile.com 
 
 The 2d species of real rights therefore is servitudes.  These are precisely the giving 
up some part of the full right of property.  As if a mans farm lies betwixt me and the 
publick road or any market town, I may by agreement or by law (as we shall 
hereafterwards observe) obtain a servitude (that is, relaxation of his exclusive right) by 
which I am allowed to travel on horse or foot or drive carriages thro' his farm. 
In the later course of lectures, the passage corresponding to this one118 
summarizes Smith's view that servitudes originally gave rise to personal 
rights.  The passage quoted here, on the other hand, repeats the standard view 
that all servitudes are a relaxation of a right of property119—a view omitted 
from the later accounts120.  It is possible that at the time he gave this 
conventional account (27 December 1762121) he did not yet appreciate the 
problem in chronology that 'real rights in the immoveable property of another' 
would cause.  If this is right, the problem came to his attention at some time 
between that day and 18 January 1763, when he gave the new account, having 
taken guidance from Cocceji122.  
 Cocceji's guidance may have created problems of its own, however.  There 
is virtually no discussion of personal servitudes in Roman law in either course 
of lectures, so far as I am aware123.  It is particularly surprising to find no 
 
118 Quoted above accompanying note 14. 
119 More or less like the account given by Hutcheson, System, 1 (supra, n. 27), p. 351. 
120 Cf. LJ(A) ii.38 (servititude 'always implies that there is a jus in re aliena 
constitutum').  Since this contradicts the 'originally personal' thesis, I take Smith to be 
referring to the modern law, which the context supports. 
121 In giving this date I am following the suggestion of the editors.  See Meek, et al., 
edd., Lectures on Jurisprudence (supra, n. 1) , Introduction, p. 18. 
122 Similarly, Smith's account of pledge in LJ(A) i.18-19, accompanying his 
conventional account of servitudes, is itself conventional: this supports the idea that he did not 
consult Cocceji until after this lecture. 
123 There is one sentence in LJ(A) ii.16 which alludes to Roman personal servitudes:  
Most of these [predial servitudes EM] besides many others are in use amongst us. {The 
life rent or 2dly the use of a house or other subject, as the opera servorum, may also be 
considered as servitudes as soon as it is lawfull, as it certainly may be, to sell a superiority 
with such a burthen} 
The corresponding passage in LJ(B) 172 says more briefly 'Life rents on estates and many 
other things are also servitudes, and are properly personal.'  A 'life rent' is the Scots equivalent 
of usus fructus; 'use of a house or other subject' must be a reference to habitatio and usus; and 
opera servorum is what is usually more fully given as opera servorum vel animalium.  All of 
these are Roman personal servitudes, but confusingly Smith is not discussing Roman law.  He 
has begun a discussion of feudal law, and is speaking of the sale of the rights of a feudal 
superior, where the property is burdened by a life rent.  The '2dly' muddies things by 
introducing three Roman rights.  To make matters more confusing, the bracketed sentence 
does not appear on the page with the main body of the text, but on the reverse.  This means 
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discussion of Roman usufruct124.  Personal and predial servitudes are different 
in many respects, but from Justinian onwards the usual textbook treatment 
keeps them together125, and this is certainly what Hutcheson (whom Smith 
follows so closely126) does127.  Does the omission of Roman personal 
servitudes say anything about the progress of Smith's views? 
  There are two innocent explanations for the omission: (1) Smith had 
nothing to say about personal servitudes because they had no special qualities 
which any historical age could be said to 'determine'; or (2) personal 
servitudes presented no special problems as predial servitudes did, and thus 
there was no urgent reason to discuss them.  The less innocent explanation—
which I suggest is the correct one—is that Smith, though agreeing with 
Cocceji that all servitudes originally gave rise to personal rights128, was unable 
to make the case for personal servitudes.  Cocceji gives the same argument for 
both kinds of servitude: they were easy to frustrate, and awkward to enforce, 
until they were made real129.  The argument is adequate for most personal 
servitudes—habitatio, usus, opera servorum—but for usus fructus, the most 
common one, the argument does not work at all.  This is because usus fructus 
is not simply a right to possess and use, which could conceivably be the object 
of a simple bilateral relation, but a right to take and become owner of fruits 
which would otherwise be another's property130.  Cocceji's argument misses 
the fact that if a usufruct had ever created personal rights and personal rights 
only, it would provide no fruits to the usufructuary and would be no usufruct 
at all131.  This suggests the possibility that Smith, though happy to adopt 
 
that its position in the text is not absolutely certain (though by reference to the corresponding 
passage in LJ(B) the sentence belongs either where it is printed or after the sentence 
immediately following).  My best judgment is that Smith has added Roman servitudes to the 
discussion to show hypothetically how they would be treated in feudal law.  He is nevertheless 
silent on how they arose in Roman law, which is my point above. 
124 There is the briefest mention in LJ(A) iii.85, and discussions of life rent in Scots law 
in places, but no proper discussion of the Roman institution anywhere, so far as I am aware. 
125 See Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis 1.12.8; Heineccius, Elementa iuris civilis 
secundum ordinem Institutionum (supra, n. 27), § 392; Arnold Vinnius, Institutionum 
imperialium commentarius academicus et forensis, J. G. Heineccius recensuit, Leiden 1726, 
ad Inst. 2.3. 
126 See Meek, ed., Anderson Notes (supra, n. 1), p. 461-66. 
127 Hutcheson, System, 1 (supra, n. 27), p. 351; idem, Short Introduction (supra, n. 27), 
p. 169-70. 
128 LJ(A) ii.14. 
129 See Appendix. 
130 See, e.g., D.7.1.7 pr.-2 (Ulpian 17 Sab.). 
131 My main point is that Cocceji does not give a cogent argument for the 'personal' 
origin of usufruct (and that Smith saw through it), but I should not leave the impression that 
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Cocceji's theory as it related to predial servitudes, preferred to stay silent on 
the origins of personal servitudes. 
8.  —  The wider problem, of which servitudes in an example 
I have been discussing a problem with servitudes alone, and it would be 
wrong to exaggerate the problem or to suggest that Smith was overly bothered 
by it.  The nature of the problem is nevertheless revealing, because it shows 
that Smith's historical jurisprudence brought him face-to-face with certain 
opponents that his natural-law predecessors had less trouble with: the Roman 
lawyers.  Carmichael, for example, was unhappy with Pufendorf's belief that 
agreements between men to limit their ownership took place in society, but not 
in a state of nature.  Carmichael suggested that such 'agreements or 
dispositions' could indeed take place in a state of nature, and he mentions 
servitudes as an example of this132.  It is a simple argument: to make the point 
that a bare 'servitude agreement' could exist in a state of nature, he did not 
have to do battle with the juristic literature; all the lawyerly refinements in the 
law of servitudes could, so to speak, be left among the great mass of 
adventitious rules and ignored.  Similarly, Heineccius has only to make the 
point that servitudes were naturally created by an act of will, and to dismiss all 
the rest as the 'subtle creations of jurists'133.  Smith's natural jurisprudence, on 
the other hand, was more ambitious and in many respects harder to prove.  
Whenever Smith sought to give a historical account of a Roman rule or 
institution, he ran the risk of coming up against a contrary historical account 
in the Roman sources.  Contrary accounts are not intrinsically fatal to Smith's 
enterprise; the right history is not necessarily the one a jurist gives or the legal 
 
'usufruct created a right of ownership' because the institution is more subtle than that.  The 
usufructuary only became owner of the fruits by taking them; what qualified as a fruit was 
circumscribed; and whether a usufruct was an incident of ownership or an independent right 
was, and is, disputed.  See Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht (supra, n. 18), p. 447-51; W. W. 
Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law, 3rd ed. rev P. Stein, Cambridge 1963, p. 269-71.  An 
unusual description of usufruct, from some years ago, says that usufruct was not even itself a 
servitude, but that 'usufruct had a servitude', namely the physical possession of the corpus, by 
means of which the usufruct was exercised.  K. Kagan, The Nature of Servitudes and the 
Association of Usufruct with them, Tulane Law Review, 22 (1947), p. 94-110.  The 
description is a reasonable attempt to show that usufruct is not ownership, but necessarily 
carries ownership within itself. 
132 Carmichael, Supplementa (supra, n. 27), p. 133-34. 
133 Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, Elementa juris naturae et gentium, Venice 1802, p. 221 
(§ 282). The passage refers to § 279, where the author discusses the view that what passes by 
traditio is only what the person wills.  Ibid., p. 219. 
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forms imply.  But it may take argument and effort to show why the sources 
have it wrong.  Some contrary accounts Smith chose to ignore, as for example 
he chose to ignore the fact that some 'lawyers' regarded intervening in 
another's chase as a breach of property (though according to Smith property 
did not exist in the earliest age)134.  But the anomaly of a right in immoveable 
property existing in an age before immoveable property was recognized was 
serious and could not be ignored. 
 I mentioned above that Smith uses his historical jurisprudence for two 
purposes: (1) to speculate about the development of historical rights whose 
history is otherwise unknown, and (2) to show how some historical rights 
deviated from the model135.  The first of these is difficult to accomplish when 
the subject is Roman law.  The thesis that certain rights tend to arise under 
certain conditions is not an easy thesis to maintain in the face of a highly 
developed legal literature, and that is the lesson of Smith's treatment of 
Roman servitudes.  Smith's single most successful effort to bring Roman law 
into his historical jurisprudence is his treatment of the Roman rules of 
occupation, described in detail above136.  Was it his only real success?  The 
editors of the Lectures have noted that Smith altered the second course of 
lectures in a way that downplays the four ages as a framework for private law.  
Where in the earlier lectures the discussion of the four ages introduces 
acquisition of property generally, in the latter the discussion has been altered 
so as to introduce occupation only137.  Though mode of subsistence is still 
used in the latter course of lectures to explain other rules of private law, the 
change of emphasis is clear. 
In closing I note that Smith's remarks on the original nature of servitudes 
are not entirely contrary to current opinion.  Watson, for example, accepts the 
common view that originally servitudes in some way involved ownership over 
the object of the servitude, but expresses doubts about one argument which 
supports the view:138 the argument that, because early law recognized 
ownership as the only real right, and because in early law the four original 
servitudes could only be transferred by mancipatio, those servitudes 
necessarily vested ownership in part of the land139.  He begins with a 'mode of 
subsistence' observation: 'As a social and economic fact those things which 
 
134 Above, note 78.  The 'lawyers' are also ignored in LJ(A) i.65, 75-76 (accession); i.73-
75 (specification). 
135 Above, note 63 and accompanying text. 
136 Above, notes 78 to 83 and accompanying text. 
137 Meek, et al., edd., Lectures on Jurisprudence (supra, n. 1) , Introduction, p. 30. 
138 Watson, The Law of Property (supra, n. 20), p. 92-94. 
139 Kaser, Privatrecht (supra, n. 18), p. 143. 
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came to be legally recognized as the four original servitudes are of extreme 
importance in a primitive agricultural society.'140  He then argues that 
mancipatio was probably the only available method for transferring a 
servitude, whatever its character.  He concludes141: 
Given the social importance of the four original servitude situations, the resulting need for 
a legal method of creating servitudes, the fact that no other possible direct method of 
creating servitudes existed, and that individuals must have tried to create servitudes by 
mancipatio, I think it could easily happen that 'servitudes' created by mancipatio would be 
given legal recognition even without there being the slightest feeling that the servitude 
was a corporeal thing or that what was being transferred was ownership of the land over 
which the way or aqueduct passed. 
Diósdi is another sceptic of the prevailing view, and some of his views recall 
Smith's, though he avoids the anachronism of Smith's real/personal 
distinction142: 
It is indeed questionable whether the idea of walking or going o[n] the strip of land 
designed for it was the primary meaning of via.  In other words in this case, I think that 
the act is a more concrete idea than the thing necessary for realizing it. 
 He goes on to challenge the view that ancient servitudes were corporeal143, 
arguing as Watson does that they were treated as res mancipi only so that 
mancipatio could be used to transfer them.   He concludes that they came into 
existence as 'independent rights', perhaps lacking a definite form of legal 
protection144. 
 Both writers are making a different point than Smith, that originally 
predial servitudes were not necessarily corporeal rights.  But the exercise is 
broadly the same: both writers show that one can give a sociological account 
of the development of servitudes that goes contrary to the legal sources; that 
what the jurists said or what the legal forms imply is not the final word; in 
short, that Smith's battle was winnable. 
9.  —  Appendix: Cocceji on servitudes 
Samuel L.B. von Cocceji, Introductio ad Henrici L. B. Cocceii . . . 
 
140 Watson, The Law of Property (supra, n. 20), p. 92-93. 
141 Ibid., p. 94. 
142 Diósdi, Ownership (supra, n. 18), p. 114. 
143 Ibid., p. 113-16. 
144 Ibid., p. 116. 
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Grotium Illustratum, continens dissertationes prooemiales, Halle 1748, Diss. 
XII ('Systema de iustitia naturali et romana'),  4.3.6 (§§ 302-305). 
The text below is a short discussion of the nature of servitudes by Samuel 
von Cocceji.  He makes a similar but more brief observation in Heinrich von 
Cocceji, Grotius Illustratus, seu commentarii ad Hugonis Grotii de jure belli 
et pacis libros tres, 1, Wratislava 1744, p. 79 (at Grotius 1.1.4).   Grotius is 
here speaking of the nature of rights, and how they give a moral quality to 
one's acts, even though they may, as in the case of predial servitudes, relate to 
a piece of property.  To Grotius' comment ut servitus praediorum, quae jura 
realia dicuntur, Heinrich von Cocceji comments that these rights, though real, 
do give rights to persons.  Samuel von Cocceji takes issue with this: Jure 
naturae servitutes non pertinent ad jura realia, sed omne jus hic oritur ex 
pacto, unde tantum oritur obligatio personalis.  He then refers the reader to 
the text set out below.  His footnotes are included below but modernized. 
a)  Text 
UBI PROBATUR, SERVITUTES NATURA NON ESSE JUS IN RE 
§ CCCII.  Jurisconsulti Romani praeter dominium, et, quae dominii species 
est, haereditatem, adhuc duas alias species juris in re constituerunt, nimirum 
servitutem et pignus.  Nos demonstrabimus, haec iura in re ex mera ratione 
juris civilis originem traxisse: Primo autem de servitute agemus.  
§ CCCIII.  SERVITUS sua natura nihil aliud est, quam pactum de usu rei suae 
in alium transferendo, ex omni autem pacto saltem oritur actio personalis.  
Neque enim usus alii permittitur alia intentione, quam ut utatur vi pacti; unde 
non magis jus in re oritur, quam ex pacto commodati, et locati, quo utilitas rei 
meae vel gratis, vel pro mercede in alium transfertur. 
§ CCCIV.  Ratio autem, cur Jurisconsulti Romani ei, qui servitutem talem 
quaesivit, ius in ipsa re competere voluerint, in aprico est.  Nam 
I.)  In servitutibus praedialibus Jurisconsulti Romani supponunt (a) duo 
praedia145, <(b)> eaque vicina146: (c) ut servitus utilitatem habeat147; et quidem 
(d) perpetuam148. 
 
145 J.2.3 pr.; D.8.2.23.1 (Pomp. 23 Sab.). 
146 D.8.3.5.1 (Ulp. 17 ed.). 
147 D.8.1.15 pr. (Pomp. 33 Sab.); D.8.3.5 (Ulp. 17 ed.); D.8.1.8 (Paul 15 Plaut.). 
148 D.8.2.28 (Paul 15 Sab.). 
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 Hac forma posita, Jurisconsulti Romani crediderunt actionem personalem 
non sufficere ad utilitatis illius perpetuae effectum consequendum: Nam (1) 
dominus praedii servientis, alienando praedium, intervertere servitutem quae 
praedio meo perpetuam utilitatem procurare debet, posset: Sed et (2) si tertius 
me in servitute turbaret, vel usum rei prohiberet, actio non contra turbantem, 
sed contra dominum praedii, intendanda esset, et hic demum actionem contra 
turbantem intentare, vel eam cedere deberet149. 
 Ne igitur per indirectum quis privetur utilitate praedio suo utili, eique 
perpetuo destinata, actionem realem dedere Legislatores Romani praedio 
dominanti, ejusque possessori, ut servitutem a quocunque possessore vindicare 
possit: Atque hinc quasi traditionem quoque requirunt (quia ius in re non nisi 
traditione constituitur,) pro traditione autem ipsis est usus actualis, vel 
patientia domini150. 
 Hanc autem constitutionem esse mere civilem, patet (1) ex forma lege 
praescripta, qua cessante actio personalis manet.  Nam (2) servitus, quae in 
praediis non vicinis constituitur, actionem producit mere personalem151:  
Aeque ac (3) servitutes, quae praedio meo utiles non sunt, uti si paciscor cum 
vicino domino, ne per fundum suum eat, aut ibi consistat152; ne suo fundo 
fruatur; ne in suo fundo aquam quaerat; ne viridaria tollat; ut locum suum 
amoeniorem reddat mei prospectus causa, etc153. Huc quoque pertinet pactum, 
ut spatiari, coenare, pomum decerpere in vicino liceat154.  Sed et (4) mera actio 
personalis mihi datur, si servitus non habet causam perpetuam155.  Si vero (5) 
servitus, seu jus percipiendi utilitatem in praedio alieno, sua natura jus aliquod 
in re ipsa nobis concederet, id quoque verum esset in praediis non viciniis, et 
licet praedium inde perpetuam utilitatem non haberet. 
§ CCCV.  II.)  In servitutibus personalibus ratio juris civilis itidem clara est.  
Nam (1) Jurisconsulti Romani quatuor saltem casibus usum rei alienae inter 
jura in re retulerunt (a) in usufructu, si usufructus, i.e. jus utendi fruendi re 
aliena, salva substantia, alicui pacto conceditur: vel quoties res, quae usu 
consumuntur, ea lege utendae conceduntur, ut vel res in genere, vel earum 
aestimatio restituatur, quod negotium quasi usufructus vocatur, ubi cautio loco 
 
149 Vide D.7.1.12.5 (Ulp. 17 Sab.); D.47.2.62(61).8 (Afric. 8 quaest.); D.19.2.60.5 (Lab. 
5 post. Iav. epit.), etc. 
150 D.8.1.20 (Jav. 5 post. Lab.). 
151 D.34.1.18 [sc. D.34.1.14.3 (Ulp. 2 fid.)]. 
152 D.8.1.15 (Pomp. 33 Sab.). 
153 D.8.1.15.1 (Pomp. 33 Sab.). 
154 D.8.1.8 pr. (Paul 15 Plaut.). 
155 D.8.2.28 (Paul 15 Sab.); Gothofredus ad h. l. 
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proprietatis est, quae ex natura rei salva esse nequit.  (b)  In usu, si jus utendi 
fruendi re aliena salva substantia, ad quotidianas necessitates alicui 
permittitur.  (c)  In habitatione, si non totus aedium usufructus, sed saltem pars 
ea, quae in habitando consistit, conceditur.  (d)  In opera servorum, si itidem 
non totius servi usufructus sed ea pars, quae in operis consistit, alicui 
conceditur. 
 In omnibus reliquis casibus actio manet personalis, uti si per commodatum 
res alii utenda gratis conceditur, item si per locationem usus rei pro mercede in 
alium transfertur; porro, si per pactum jus decerpendi pomum in vicino horto 
permittitur156.  Etc. 
 Cum igitur (2) saltem in quatuor illis casibus specialibus constitutum sit, ut 
actio realis detur, non in aliis, (ubi tamen eadem juris naturalis ratio est,) hae 
ipsae exceptiones probant, constitutionem illam esse mere civilem.  Ratio 
autem, cur (3) Jurisconsulti Romani hos quatuor casus inter jura in re 
retulerunt, eadem videtur fuisse, quae in servitutibus realibus: Nam hoc 
quoque pacto utilitas quaedam perpetua in utentem transfertur, (sua enim 
natura non nisi morte finitur) quam dominus rei fructuario per indirectum 
auferre posset, rem alienando: (nam emtor non tenetur stare pacto 
antecessoris) quo casu fructuario nil nisi actio personalis superesset, ad id 
quod interest.  Sed et si tertius aliquis hunc fructuarium impediret, hic contra 
solum dominum rei, dominus autem demum contra turbantem agere 
deberet157.  Has ambages tollunt legislatores Romani, dando actionem realem 
possessori servitutis. 
 Sane (4) ob has utilitatis rationes Jurisconsulti Romani etiam in aliis 
causis, quae sua natura obligationem personalem producunt, jus aliquod in re 
constituerunt.  Haec enim ratio est, cur conductori vel emtori superficiei, si 
aedificat, plantat, vel alio modo aliquid imponit, actio realis detur: Si quis 
enim in superficiei usu turbatur, actione personali ex conducto vel emto cum 
domino agere, et dominus cedere suas actiones superficiario tenebatur158, sed 
longe utilius visum est (quia melius est possidere, quam in personam experiri) 
quasi in rem actionem polliceri, atque ideo Praetor actionem realem inde 
dedit159.  Jure naturali igitur conductor vel emtor jus reale in superficiem non 
habet, (superficies enim naturali jure cedit solo160) sed Praetor ex singulari illa 
ratione dat actionem realem. 
 
156 D.8.1.8 pr. (Paul 15 Plaut.). 
157 Vide D.7.1.12.5 (Ulp. 17 Sab.); D.19.2.60.5 (Lab. 5 post. Iav. epit.). 
158 D.43.18.1.1 (Ulp. 70 ed.). 
159 D.43.18.1 (Ulp. 70 ed.). 
160 D.43.18 i.f. (Gaius 25 ed. prov.). 
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 Sed et porro, Emphyteusin, quae nihil aliud est quam locatio perpetua, 
inter jura in re retulerunt161, ac dominii speciem declararunt; ne in arbitrio 
domini sit usum illum perpetuum alienando intervertere, et ne fructuarius per 
ambages usum illum sibi afferere opus habeat. 
 Pari ergo ratione pro servitutibus vindicandis actiones reales, nimirum 
actiones confessoriae et negatoriae, datae fuit. 
b)  Translation 
WHERE I SHOW THAT BY NATURE SERVITUDES ARE NOT REAL 
RIGHTS 
§ 302.  The Roman jurists established two further kinds of ius in re other than 
dominium and hereditas (itself a kind of dominium): they are of course 
servitus and pignus.  I will show that these iura in re derive entirely from the 
reasoning of the civil law.  I must address servitudes first. 
§ 303.  By nature a SERVITUDE is simply an agreement whereby the use of 
one's own property is transferred to another, every agreement giving only a 
personal action.  And the other person is allowed the use only on the 
understanding that he use the property according to the agreement.  A real 
right does not arise here any more than in an agreement to loan or to let, where 
the benefit of my property (whether for free or for a charge) is passed to 
another. 
§ 304.  And the reason why the Roman jurists would want a person who 
sought such a servitude to have a right in the thing itself is clear.  Namely: 
I.)  In the case of praedial servitudes the Roman jurists imagined (a) two 
estates; (b) close to one another; (c) that the servitude would convey a benefit; 
and (d) that this benefit would be perpetual. 
 With this outline in mind the Roman jurists believed that a personal action 
would not adequately ensure that the benefit would be perpetual: for (1) the 
owner of the burdened estate, by conveying the estate to another, would be 
able to subvert the servitude, which ought to be securing a perpetual benefit 
for my estate.  Moreover, (2) if a third person had disturbed me in the use of 
my servitude, or prevented my use of the property, my claim would have had 
 
161 D.6.3.1.1 (Paul 21 ed.); D.13.7.16.2 (Paul 29 ed.). 
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to be directed, not against the man disturbing me, but against the owner of the 
estate, and only then would the owner have been obliged to bring a claim 
against the man disturbing me, or cede the claim to me. 
 Therefore lest anyone be deprived indirectly of the benefit accruing to his 
estate, and so that he could enjoy the benefit in perpetuity, the Roman 
legislators162 gave a real action to the dominant estate and its possessor, so that 
he could assert his ownership of the servitude from any possessor whatsoever.  
And therefore they also demand something like tradition (because a real right 
is created only by tradition), but they regard actual use, or forbearance by the 
owner, as the equivalent of tradition163. 
 That this arrangement is merely civil is made clear by (1) the legal164 
requirements, failing which a personal action remains.  For (2) a servitude 
which is established for two estates which are not close to one another gives 
rise to a mere personal action.  The same is true of (3) servitudes which do not 
benefit my estate, for example if I agree with the owner next door that he shall 
not go across his own land, or not remain there; that he shall not enjoy his own 
land; that he shall not obtain water from his own land; that he shall not remove 
trees, a removal which would make his property the more pleasant for my 
view165; etc.  The same is also true of an agreement allowing one to stroll, 
dine, or gather fruit on a neighbouring property.  Moreover, (4) a mere 
personal action is granted to me if the servitude is not aimed at securing 
something in perpetuity.  But (5) if a servitude, that is to say a right of 
obtaining a benefit in the estate of another, had by nature given one some right 
in the thing itself, the right would have extended to non-neighbouring estates, 
 
162 I am not able to determine what law or laws Cocceji is referring to.  He may have 
believed that the lex Scribonia (see D.41.3.4.28(29) (Paul 54 ed.)) made servitudes real at the 
same time as it forbid their usucaption.  This is contrary to the modern view, that the lex 
abolished the usucaption of servitudes because they had come to be treated as res 
incorporales.  Diósdi, Ownership (supra, n. 18), p. 111.  It is also possible (1) that he 
misunderstood the Servian and quasi-Servian actions as Smith did, or (2) that he is drawing 
some inference from D.8.5.2 pr. (Ulp. 17 ed.), quoted above in note 25. 
163 In the cited passage (D.8.1.20) Javolenus expresses the opinion that the exercise of 
the right should be regarded as the equivalent to tradition of possession. 
164 He may mean 'statutorily prescribed', with lege being a reference to the 'legislatores 
Romani', above.  
165 The last of these examples is confused; in the cited passage, Pomponius has left off 
speaking about the issue of 'benefit', and is now addressing servitudes which attempt to make 
the servient owner do something (such as remove trees).  Cocceji seems to believe Pomponius 
is still talking about 'benefit' and, in an effort to force the example to make sense, has given 
the very contrived example of a servitude not to remove trees, where the removal would effect 
a benefit to the neighbouring property. 
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even if the estate did not enjoy a perpetual benefit. 
§ 305.  II.)  In the case of personal servitudes the reasoning of the civil law is 
equally apparent.  For (1) in only four cases did the Roman Jurists include the 
use of another's property in the category of real rights: (a) in usufruct, where 
the usufruct (i.e., the right to use, and to the fruits of, the property of another, 
but not the substance) is granted by agreement to someone; or whenever things 
which are consumed by use are given to the user on the condition that a thing 
of the same kind, or its equivalent, is restored, a transaction which is called 
'quasi-usufruct' (where a cautio is given for the property which, because of the 
nature of the thing, cannot be preserved);  (b) in usus, where a person is 
allowed, for ordinary needs, the right to use, and to the fruits of, the property 
of another, but not the substance;  (c) in habitatio, where not the entire 
usufruct in a building, but only that part which constitutes occupancy, is 
granted;  (d) in opera servorum, where similarly not the usufruct of the whole 
slave, but that part which constitutes daywork, is granted to someone. 
In all of the remaining cases there is but a personal action, as when one is 
granted the use of another's thing gratuitously by commodatum; similarly 
when the use of a thing is transferred to another for a charge by locatio; 
further, when one is allowed by agreement to pick the fruit in the neighbouring 
garden, etc. 
Therefore because (2) it was decided that in only four specific cases a real 
action would be given, and not in others (though the same natural-law 
reasoning obtains there), these very exceptions show that this arrangement is 
merely civil.  The reason, moreover, why (3) the Roman Jurists classified 
those four cases as real rights appears to be the same as in the case of real 
servitudes: in this kind of agreement, too, a kind of perpetual benefit is 
transferred to the user (by its very nature ended only by death), a benefit 
which the owner of the thing is able indirectly to spoil for the fructuary by 
selling the thing (for the buyer is not bound by the agreement of his 
predecessor), in which event only a personal action, for the amount the matter 
is worth, remains to the fructuary.  Yet even if some third person should 
impede that fructuary, he would be obliged to sue only the owner of the thing, 
the owner then being obliged to sue the one disturbing the fructuary.  The 
Roman legislators got rid of this merry-go-round by giving a real action to the 
possessor of the servitude. 
It was clearly for these reasons of utility that the Roman jurists extended 
the idea of real rights to other causes.  This is the very reason why the 
conductor or buyer of a superficies is given a real action if he builds, plants, or 
otherwise installs something on the property.  For if anyone was disturbed in 
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the use of a superficies, he was required to sue the owner by a personal actio 
ex conducto or ex empto, and the owner was required to cede his actions 
[against the one disturbing] to the superficiary, but to offer an action quasi in 
rem seemed much more useful (because it is better to be in possession than to 
undertake a personal action166), and in fact the Praetor subsequently gave a 
real action.  Accordingly, by natural law the conductor or buyer does not have 
a real right in the superficies (indeed by natural law the superficies cedes to 
the land), but in each case the Praetor gives a real action for the reasons cited. 
What is more, they [sc. the Roman Jurists] included emphyteusis, which is 
simply a perpetual hire, among the class of real rights, and they declared it a 
kind of ownership, lest the owner take it upon himself to subvert that perpetual 
use by transfer, and lest the fructuary have the task of recovering his use by a 
circuit of actions. 
So for the same reasons, real actions were permitted for the vindication of 
servitudes; they are of course the actiones confessoria and negatoria. 
 
 
166 Cocceji's possidere makes more sense with the knowledge that, in his source, an 
interdict is under discussion.  See D.43.18.1.1 (Ulp. 70 ed.): Sed longe utile visum est, . . . quia 
melius est possidere potius quam in personam experiri, hoc interdictum proponere et quasi in 
rem actionem polliceri. 
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